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RECENT DECISIONS

RECENT
Wearing Religious Garb
On February 2, 1956, the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky affirmed in
part and reversed in part, the decision of
the Circuit Court in Rawlings v. Butler.1
However, in so doing, the Court held that
Sisters of the Roman Catholic Church may
teach in the public schools while wearing
their religious garments.
Three problems were presented on
appeal:
(1) May the Board of Education expend
public tax money in the payment of the
salaries of Sisters of the Roman Catholic
Church who are teaching in the public
schools while dressed in religious garb

and wearing symbols of their religion?
(2) May the School Board pay rent to the
Catholic Church for buildings in which
public school classes are taught?
(3) May the School Board spend public

money for transporting Catholic children to public schools?
In answering the first question in the
affirmative, the Court commented:
While the dress and emblems worn by
these Sisters proclaim them to be members

of certain organizations of the Roman Catholic Church and that they have taken certain
religious vows, these facts do not deprive
them of their right to teach in public schools,
so long as they do not inject religion or the
dogma of their church. The garb does not
teach. It is the woman within who teaches.
The dress of the Sisters denotes modesty, unworldliness and an unselfish life. No mere
significance or insignificance of garb could
124 U. S. L. WEEK 1126, 2374 (1956). (The references to the opinion of the Court herein refer
to an unofficial and as yet unpublished copy of the
opinion.) For a discussion of the opinion of the
lower court see 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 62 (Jan.
1955).
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conceal a teacher's character. Her daily life
would either exalt or make obnoxious the
sectarian belief of a teacher.
Our General Assembly has not yet prescribed what dress a woman teaching in the
public schools must wear, or whether she
may adorn herself with a ring, button, or any
other emblem signifying she is a member of
a sorority. These Sisters are not teaching
religion in the public schools or attempting
to force their religious views on the pupils
under their charge. The religious views of
these Sisters and their mode of dress are entirely personal to them. If they were prevented from teaching in the public schools
because of their religious beliefs, then they
would be denied equal protection of the law
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution.
Appellant-taxpayer, however, argued that
the Sisters' garb itself impresses on the
children the religious faith of its wearers.
The Court rejected this argument, and referred to the case of Hysong v. School District, wherein it was said:
The religious belief of teachers and all
others is generally well known to the neighborhood and to pupils, even if not made
noticeable in the dress, for that belief is not
secret, but is publicly professed. Are the
courts to decide that the cut of a man's coat
or the color of a woman's gown is sectarian
teaching, because they indicate sectarian
religious belief? If so, then they can be
called upon to go further. The religion of
the teacher being known, a pure, unselfish
life, exhibiting itself in tenderness to the
young, and helpfulness for the suffering,
necessarily tends to promote the religion of
the man or woman who lives it. Insensibly,
in both young and old, there is a disposition
to reverence such a one, and at least, to
some extent, consider the life as the fruit
of the particular religion. Therefore, irre-
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proachable conduct, to that degree, is sectarian teaching. But shall the education of
the children of the commonwealth be entrusted only to those men and women who
2
are destitute of any religious belief?
A "more difficult question".for the Court
was presented by section 189 of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibits using
public funds to aid any church, sectarian
or denominational school. Are the salaries
paid to these Sisters, who have taken a vow
of poverty and thus are obliged to contribute their salaries to their orders, really contributions to the Catholic Church?
The majority replied in the negative. The
Sisters are paid in the same manner as
other teachers; they endorse their own
checks. The salaries paid to these Sisters
are their own, and they may dispose of
them as they see fit. To prohibit them from
contributing their checks to their orders
would itself constitute a denial of religious
liberty. The Court did indicate, however,
that a state constitutional question might
arise were the Sisters "but the conduits
through which public school funds are
channelled into the coffers of the Catholic
Church."
The second question presented was answered in the affirmative, i.e., the School
Board could pay rent to the Catholic
Church for buildings in which public school
classes were taught. There was one caveat.
The Church may not attempt to exercise
any dominion or control over the schools
or the classes taught therein, and the Board
must have complete control of the
3
buildings.
2 164 Pa. St. 629, 30 Atd. 482, 484 (1894).
3 The Court distinguished the facts in the instant
case from the case of Berghorn v. Reorganized
School District, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W. 2d 573
(1953), where the payments were disallowed. In

The third problem presented to the Court
was answered in the negative. The School
Board may not expend school funds for the
purpose of transporting children to secular
or private schools. 4 However, the Court
pointed out that the fiscal courts may contribute tax money for the purpose of accommodating all primary school children
in the state who are not within walking distance of their school.5
The instant case raises the question of
what the solution would be had the Court
decided against the wearing of religious
garb as has been done in several other
states. 6 The dissenting opinion indicates
that case the buildings rented to the school boards
by the church were under the same roof as the
church, or church school, or were immediately
adjoining the church or rectory, or Sisters resided in the buildings rented to the school board,
or the buildings contained religious symbols. Accord: Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P. 2d 949
(1951).
4 In Sherrard v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W. 2d 963 (1942), the
Court held as unconstitutional an act of the General Assembly of 1949 (KY. STAT. §4399-20)
which had authorized such expenditures.
5 In Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W. 2d
930 (1945), the Court held unconstitutional an
act of the General Assembly of 1944 (Ky. REV.
STAT. 158.115) permitting fiscal courts to contribute tax money to supplement bus transportation
for all children, on the theory that this was necessary to protect them from highway hazards.
6 Three states, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, have specifically prohibited the wearing of
religious garb by any persons teaching in the
public schools. See NEB. REV. STAT. §79-1274
(1950 Reissue); ORE. REV. STAT. §342.650
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §11-1112 (Pur-

don 1945) (Supp. 1954). In two other states,
New Mexico and New York, the courts have
barred the wearing of religious garb by persons
teaching in public schools. See Zellers v. Huff,
55 N.M. 501, 236 P. 2d 949 (1951); O'Connor
v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906)
(Superintendent of Public Instruction could prohibit it by departmental regulation).
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that there would be no objection to the
Sisters' teaching in public schools, if they
would "exchange their religious raiment
and insignia for a dress or garment that is
without distinctive suggestion and which
does not itself proclaim sectarianism in
action. .. ." But if the orders of Sisters
were willing to adopt a modem costume as
their habit, would not that, too, soon become "dated"? Would not the very similarity of each Sister's dress soon "proclaim
identity and doctrinal religious service"?
It seems inescapable that such would eventually fall within the purview of these
statutes.
For those orders of Sisters engaged in
teaching in public schools, the ultimate
solution to the problem may lie in a modeling of their rule on one similar to that used
by the Daughters of the Heart of Mary
(the Nardins). In that order the Sisters
dress in conservatively modern clothes of
their own choosing. This avoids the objection that their very garb tends to proselytize, or that the uniformity of their dress
proclaims religious service. Moreover, this
would be in keeping with the appeal of
Pope Pius XII, contained in an address to
the Mothers Superior of various women's
religious orders, attending an international
congress in Rome during September of
1952. 7 His Holiness urged some modifications in the traditional nuns' dress, with a
view toward encouraging a greater number
of women to enter the religious orders. It
would seem that exchanging their religious
habits for modern dress in order that they
might teach the young would give impetus
to compliance with the spirit of the Holy
Father's appeal.
7 N. Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1952, p. 31, col. 2.

Fluoridation and Religion
The city of Bend, Oregon, adopted an
ordinance providing for the introduction
of fluorine into the public water supply as a
palliative measure to prevent dental caries
in children. The plaintiff, a resident of the
city, commenced litigation to enjoin the
proposed action, claiming that the ordinance
was unconstitutional on two grounds first,
that it would deprive him of his liberty under the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment; and more specifically, that
since fluoridation amounted to forced medication, it would encroach upon his freedom
of religion secured by the 1st and 14th
Amendments to the Federal Constitution,
and by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
of Oregon. The religion of the plaintiff is
nowhere stated in the opinion. Plaintiff appealed from a determination for the defendant city, the Supreme Court of Oregon holding that the fluoridation enactment was a
reasonable and valid exercise of the State's
police power to provide for the health and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. The Court in its opinion negated the
plaintiff's objection that the ordinance constituted an unreasonable impingement upon
his religious freedom. Baer v. City of Bend,
-Ore.-, 292 P. 2d 134 (1956).
The present case, involving the controversial problem of fluoridation of drinking
water,1 is hardly one of first impression. The
1 For an exhaustive study of the medical and legal
aspects of fluoridation see Dietz, Fluoridationand
Domestic Water Supplies in California, 4 HASTINGS L. J. 1 (1952); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 2d 453
(1955) and SPIRA, THE DRAMA OF FLUORINE,
ARCH ENEMY OF MANKIND (1953).

It is interesting to note that the City of New
York has not taken a definite stand on the proposed fluoridation of the city's water supply. The

heated controversy has led to a dispute between
the Commissioner of Health, Dr. Leona Baum-
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problem has been considered in seven other
2
jurisdictions.
Fluoridation ordinances and resolutions
have withstood an assortment of objections
in these jurisdictions. Thus, it has been held
that a fluoridation ordinance was not an excessive exercise of police power granted a
municipality in its charter. 3 Similar provisions have been sustained over the objection
that they infringed upon state statutes applicable to medicine, dentistry and pure
food laws. 4 Such enactments have been held
not to be an abuse of the state's police
power 5 ; and neither discriminatory 6 nor
gartner, an ardent advocate of fluoridation and
Arthur C. Ford, Commissioner of Water. Supply,
Gas and Electric, a vigorous antagonist of the
proposal. N.Y. Times, March 28, 1956, p. 63,
col. r.
In Tuckahoe, New York, fluoridation of the
town's water supply survived a recent legal challenge. Residents charged that fluoridation was
carried on without local knowledge or consent.
The court held that since the county Health Department of Westchester absorbed the Health
Department of Eastchester and authorized the
fluoridation, the activity was perfectly valid. The
court said that fluoridation was proven safe. N.Y.
Times, March 30, 1956, p. 21, col. 8.
2 De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674,
260 P. 2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012
(1954); Chapman v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859,
74 S. 2d 142 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S.
892 (1954); Kraus v. Cleveland, 116 N.E. 2d
779 (C.P. 1953), af'd, 121 N.E. 2d 311 (Ct. App.
1954), afl'd 127 N.E. 2d 609 (Ohio 1955);
Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. 2d 859 (Okla. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Kaul v. Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, 277 P. 2d 352 (1954);
Froncek v. Milwaukee, 269 Wis. 276, 69 N.W. 2d
242 (1955).
3 See note 2 supra.
4 Chapman v. Shreveport; Kraus v. Cleveland;
Dowell v. Tulsa; Kaul v. Chehalis; Froncek v.
Milwaukee; cases cited note 2 supra.
5 De Aryan v. Butler; Chapman v. Shreveport;
Kraus v. Cleveland; Dowell v. Tulsa; Kaul v.
Chehalis; Froncek v. Milwaukee; cases cited note
2 supra.
6 Chapman v. Shreveport; Kraus v. Cleveland;

unreasonable impingements upon freedom
of religion. 7 It is the latter assertion that appears to be the most formidable proposition
and certainly the most interesting and signicant. In this regard it may be well to observe
the judicial treatment of other police power
regulations confronted with this same
objection.
That freedom of religion is a preferred
right 8 is beyond contention. However, it is
equally well recognized that it is not an absolute right but a relative one, subject to
reasonable regulation. 9 Freedom of religion
has a duel aspect: freedom of religious
belief which is absolute, and, freedom of
religious acts which may be reasonably regulated.' 0 Regulation is valid provided it is
not a palpable invasion of fundamental
rights and it bear a reasonable relationship
to a legitimate object.'t In the Cantwell case
it was stated that "In every case the power
to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to in12
fringe the protected freedom."'
Dowell v. Tulsa; Froncek v. Milwaukee; cases
cited note 2 supra. The cited cases all refute the
contention that since only children are immediately benefited by fluoridation such provisions are
discriminatory.
7 De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674,
260 P. 2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012
(1954); Kraus v. Cleveland, 116 N.E. 2d 779
(C.P. 1953), afJ'd, 121 N.E. 2d 311 (Ct. App.
1954), a0f'd, 127 N.E. 2d 609 (Ohio 1955);
Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. 2d 859 (Okla. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955); Note, 1
WAYNE L. REV. 141 (1955).

8 See West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S.
549, 567 (1911), wherein the Court stated:
"Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint,
not immunity from reasonable regulations .. "
10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
11 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
12 Cantwell v.Connecticut, supra note 10 at 304.
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The criterion most often applied in determining whether the ordinance has fallen
within the aforesaid requirements has been
Holmes' conveniently flexible "clear and
present danger" test. 13 Thus a threatened epidemic was a sufficiently "clear and present
danger" to sustain compulsory vaccination
laws, 14 even though the vaccination process
was not universally accepted as perfected
and safe. 15 That the confidence reposed in
the measure may ultimately be proven by
science to have been misplaced does not
conclusively invalidate such preventative
measures. 16 Later, it was held that required
vaccination of school children before enrollment in elementary school was perfectly
valid even though there existed no threatened epidemic. 17 'the practice of religious
tenets that contravene public policy may be
prohibited.' 8 Child labor laws have been
sustained as not violative of freedom of religion under the theory that the state stands
in a role of "parens patriae,"1 9 and the right
13 See Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

14 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra note 11. See
also Blue v. Beach, 115 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89
(1900). In reference to compulsory vaccinations
the court said that the courts will not interfere
except where the measures invade fundamental
rights or are arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable.
15 Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E.
97 (1904).
16 See note 15 supra.
17 Sadlock v. Board of Education, 137 N.J. L. 85,
58 A. 2d 218 (1948); Dunham v. Board of Education of City School District of Cincinnati, 99
N.E. 2d 183 (Ohio, C.P. 1950).
18 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Regardless of the religious belief of the Mormon
sect the Court upheld Utah legislation making
polygamous marriage a crime.
19 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
In this case a guardian was convicted under the
provisions of a'child labor statute which prohibited the distribution by minors of religious

of a State University to require an x-ray as
a condition precedent to registering has been
upheld in spite of its conflict with religious
convictions. 20 The courts have sustained a
state's interference with parental control in
order to administer exigent medical care
where the parehts of a child have refused
2
such care on religious grounds. '
The present decision follows the general
tendency revealed in these holdings. Indeed,
since chlorination has been upheld as a
22
valid exercise of the state's police power,
it is argued that there is no reason why fluoridation should not receive similar judicial
literature on the streets. The guardian had been
supplying the minor with this material and permitting the ward to distribute it. The court upheld the conviction and stated that it was not

violative of freedom of religion nor was it a denial
of equal protection of the laws under the 14th
amendment. The court reiterated that freedom of
religion was subject to incidental regulation.
20 State v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.
2d 545 (1952).
21 Morrison v. State, 252 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App.
1952); People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.
2d 769 (1952). In both cases Jehovah Witnesses
refused to allow their children, suffering from a
dangerous blood malady, to undergo blood transfusions to save their lives. The State's interference
under the theory of "parens patriae" was upheld
regardless of the religious belief of the parents.
Where parents, even because of religious
scruples, refuse to provide medical treatment for
their seriously ill children, they may be convicted
of a misdemeanor in New York. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§482 (1).
The constitutionality of this statute was upheld
in People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243
(1903). The statute was declared to be a valid
exercise of the state's police power and not an
undue deprivation of religious freedom.
22 Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 315 Mass.
335, 52 N.E. 2d 566 (1943). A chlorination regulation by the Department of Health was held a
proper exercise of the state's validly delegated
police power despite the fact that the danger
sought to be obviated was merely a potential one.
No religious question was raised or mentioned by

the court.
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approval. Proponents feel there is no real
distinction between the two. Whereas one
is an additive to the water and destroys
germs therein, the other, although in some
regions a natural element of the water, is
also an additive and builds up a resistance
23
to those germs.
23 Note, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 343 (1955).
The proponents fail to state that the fluorides
found naturally are usually organic calcium fluorides which are found in combination with other
natural elements serving to lessen and neutralize
the toxic effects of fluorine, and which can be
assimilated by the body. The artificially fluoridated water is obtained with sodium fluoride
which is an inorganic, cumulative poison eightyfive times more toxic than calcium fluoride, and
which cannot be assimilated by the body. When
sodium fluoride is added to the water, an acid,
hydrofluoric acid, an extremely active and dangerous poison, is the net result. The New York City
water supply is "soft water" (almost totally lacking calcium).
The antagonists point to the fact that many
people even now are suffering from fluorine poisoning from the presence of fluorine in foods,
cooking utensils and innumerable other sources.
Though the proponents vigorously point to the
experiments that have been conducted, and call
forth a battery of scientists' names and research
institutes that support fluoridation, the antagonists with equal vigor assert that the experiments
have first been only conducted on children. What
effect fluorine has on adults and the sick and aged
has yet to be fully determined. Secondly, they
point to the fact that the experiments have only
been conducted for the past ten years. Fluorine is
a cumulative poison and since only a small
amount is actually used by the teeth and the rest is
absorbed by the bones, the antagonists claim that
twenty or thirty years should pass before the full
effect can be determined. Thus, they liken fluorine
to strontium from the H-bomb fall-out, which is
gradually absorbed by the body having detrimental results much later. Those arguing against
fluoridation advance an impressive battery of
scientists and research groups, including the Louis
Pasteur Institute of France which is diametrically
opposed to fluoridation.
While those in favor of fluoridation believe
there are no harmful effects on health, even if
taken for a lifetime, the antagonists offer their

It has been argued that because there is
no penal or direct compulsive element to
the fluoridation ordinances (since non-fluoridated water for drinking purposes is generally available), there is no substance to
the objection such as made by the plaintiff
herein, that the ordinance involves a deprivation. Others urge that fluoridation is not
24
medication in the true sense of the word.
The Christian Scientists, who believe that
the sick are healed by mental and spiritual
practice and not by medicines, are ardent
assailants of compulsory fluoridation of
public water supplies. They regard fluoridation as compulsory medication and contrary
to their religious beliefs. They contend that
fluoridation encroaches upon the constitutional right of freedom of religious worship;
is an invalid extension of police power and
form of benevolent despotism.
Though the Christian Scientists are not
opposed to measures of sanitation or to
chlorination of water for purification purposes, fluoridation, they feel, is a transgresscientific data which unequivocally asserts that
fluorine has a deleterious effect on the kidneys,.
heart, liver, digestional tract, pancreas, nerve cells
and brain tissue. Among the diseases reputedly
caused by fluorine poisoning are pyorhhea, gingivitis and various other ectodermal lesions. Sterility
and baldness have been attributed to fluorine poisoning. It is argued that the danger of fluorine
poisoning is augmented by the fact that there is

no known antidote for it. See

SPIRA, THE DRAMA
OF FLUORINE, ARCH ENEMY OF MANKIND (1953);

Spira, Chronic Poisoning Even Without Water
Fluoridation, 6 PREVENTION 59 (1954); Holmgren, The Moral Issues in Fluoridation, 6 PREVENTION 78 (1954); Can We End Oar Toothaches?, 46 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 30
(Dec. 9, 1955); 98 CONG. REC. 2763 (1952);
Better Health for 5 to 14 Cents a Year Through
FlhoridatedWater, PURLIc HEALTH SERVICE PUBLICATION No. 62, Revised April, 1951 (U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE).
24 Note, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 343 (1955); 20
BROOKLYN L. REV.

298 (1954).
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sion of their religious beliefs and amounts to
arbitary governmental fiat. They are not opposed to any voluntary system of medicine.
Nor are they opposed to those who wish to
treat their own children's teeth according to
the latest medical theories. But to pass legislation of this nature, they contend, would
destroy any idea of voluntariness and
compel them to be subject to a system of
mass medication. While they do not attempt
to impose their beliefs on any other group,.
they feel that no one should impose medical
treatment, contrary to their deepest religious
25
convictions, on them.
The Jehovah Witnesses, frequently foes
26
of therapeutic measures, in a recent article
took no positive stand on the question
whether fluoridation violated their religious
dogma. The article presented both sides of
the fluoridation hassle and adopted a cautious attitude, implicitly favoring a "wait
and see" outlook.
Many people see fluoridation statutes as
another form of "creeping socialism" and
view with alarm what they consider the
sacrifice of individualism to the elevation of
a mass movement. They feel that individual
rights and freedom of choice are sacrificed
for the tyranriy of a majority. Democracy,
they believe, should work for all and not
merely the greater part.
25 See Statement In Opposition To The Fluorida-

tion of the New York City Public Water Supply

...[T]he

opposers to fluoridation, while not

wishing to take fluorides personally, do not
seek to deprive their fellowmen of their right
to take the chemicals. There are other ways
to take this medication. But the proponents
of fluoridation not only wish to take fluorides, but wish to force them on their unwil-

ling fellow citizens. There is a big difference
in the two groups.

27

That the state may, in the exercise of its
police power interfere with one's practice
of religion provided it is reasonably necessary for the general welfare is clear. The
courts today have a propensity to sustain
such ordinances securing the public health,
safety and welfare despite the conceded
preferential status of religious liberty. However, to what extent the police power may
be exercised without being checked by the
judiciary is not clearly defined. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United
States has not passed upon the legality of
the present problem though one case herein
cited has tried unsuccessfully to obtain certiorari. 28 Notwithstanding, fluoridation laws
appear not violative of any rights guaranteed to individuals under the Federal and
State Constitutions.
Another interesting aspect is the effect
fluoridation of drinking water has on the
fasting laws in respect to Catholics. The law
of the Eucharistic fast, stated tersely, is:
"Naturalwater does not break the Eucharistic fast." 29 This has been officially inter-

made before the New York City Counsel, Janu-

ary 26, 1956, at a public hearing on Resolution
296 by Frank S. Bartlett, Christian Science Committee on Publication for the State of New York,
representing the Christian Science denomination
and thirty-five Branch Churches of Christ, Scientist, located within the five New York City
Boroughs.
26 The Fluoridation Issue, AWAKE (March 22,

1956). AWAKE magazine is an official publication
of the Jehovah Witnesses.

27 C. W. Holmgren, The Moral Issues In Fluoridation, 6 PREVENTION 78, 83-84 (1954).
28 Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P. 2d 59 (Okla.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
29 Pope Pius XII, Apostolic Constitution,
CHRISTUS. DoMINus, 6 Jan. 1953, 45 AcTs AposTOLICAE SEDIs 5, 22 (1953). The eucharistic fast,
generally stated, denotes the abstinence from food
and drink for a stated period prior to the reception of Holy Communion.
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preted 30 to mean: "Natural water (that is,
water without any additive) no longer
breaks the Eucharistic fast." In a commentary on the subject, Palazzini 31 observes:
Water purified by a public agency, by
means of mixing with it chemical elements,
can be said to be natural water. Although
there is present in it an added foreign element, nevertheless it is water in common
use.32

Palazzini states further that:
All commentators agree in asserting this,
though they disagree in the reasons offered.
Some appeal to the common estimation of
men. Others say that the quantity of added
medicinal elements is proportionately minimal, and may be ignored. Others say that
unless this view be taken it is practically
impossible to take the benefit of the law
(Eucharistic law); finally others argue that
33
this is a perfect example of epikeia.
30 Congregation of the Holy Office, 6 Jan. 1953,
45 ACTS APOSTOLICAE SEDIs 47 (1953).

31 Pietro Palazzini, in 1953 was professor of
moral theology at the Lateran University, Rome.
32 The author's comments are based on a study
of twenty-six articles commenting upon the law
and instruction, and published in Italy, France,
England, Ireland, Spain, Germany, Belgium, Australia and the United States.
33 Palazzini, Adnotationes, 26 APOLLINARIES 81,
87 (Rome 1953). For this view he cites specifically: Connell, The New Rules for the Eucharistic
Fast, 128 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REVIEW 241-

254, 461-462 (1953); Frazioli, La Nuova Disciplina del

Diguino Eucharistico, 28

PERFICE

MuNus 382-394 (1953). "Epikeia is an interpretation exempting one from the law contrary to
the clear words of the law and in accordance with
the mind of the legislator. It is evidently a very
exceptional thing. It may be used with prudent
discretion, and is justified, only in a particular
case where: (a) the strict interpretation of the
law would work a great hardship; and (b) in view
of the usual interpretation it may be prudently
conjectured that, in this particular case, the legislator would not wish the law to be strictly applied." BOUSCAREN and ELLIS, CANON LAW 33-34

(2d Rev. ed. 1953).

it is true that the commentators refer only
to "purification" and not to fluoridation.
Nevertheless, all the reasons offered to permit use of "purified water" would seem
applicable to fluoridated water: it is water
in common use, it is natural water in the
common estimation of men, the additive is
of minimal proportions, and to exclude the
use of such water would make it impossible
for whole communities to take advantage of
the Eucharistic law. It is respectfully submitted that for the foregoing reasons there is
almost as much reason to assert that the law
is dispensed by epikeia in so closely analogous a situation.
"Charitable Purposes" Defined
Recently, the California Supreme Court
held that Section 214 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code which exempts from taxation nonprofit schools of elementary and
secondary grade contravenes neither the
state nor federal Constitution. Lundberg v.
County of Alameda [-Cal. 2d-(1956)].
In California, all property is taxable unless an exemption is authorized by the state
Constitution or granted by the laws of the
United States. However, Section Ic of
Article XIII of the state Constitution permits ". . . the Legislature [to] exempt from
taxation all or any portion of property
used exclusively for religious, hospital or
charitable purposes ..
The statute in question granted an exemption to property ". . . used exclusively
for school purposes of less than collegiate
grade and owned and operated by religious,
hospital or charitable funds, foundations or
corporations." At issue was the interpretation of the term "charitable" as employed
in the California Constitution.
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The Court followed the Estate of Henderson case [17 Cal. 2d 853, 112 P. 2d 605
(1941)], which held a charitable institution to be one whose ".. . aims and accomplishments are of religious, educational
(emphasis supplied), political or general
social interest to mankind. . ." (112 P. 2d
at 607), thus embracing the educational
purpose which was the subject of the disputed statute.
In a strong dissenting opinion concurred
in by two of the justices it was argued that
the legislative history of Section lc of the
California Constitution clearly evidenced an
intent to exclude educational purposes and
that accordingly, the statute in question was
unconstitutional. The majority felt that the
legislative history of the constitutional provision was inconclusive as to intent and that
absent a clear showing to the contrary the
construction of the term "charitable" as
settled by decisional law should prevail.
Although the principal issue, as focused
upon by both the majority and dissenting
opinions, was the question of construction, a federal question was also raised.
Plaintiff, a citizen-taxpayer, contended that
Section 214 constitutes a violation of the
"establishment clause" of the First Amendment. The majority opinion disposed of
that contention on two grounds; first, that
the exemption did not directly benefit any
religious group but inured to the advantage
of te public in general, and second, that
even if ba direct benefit could be found, tax
exemptions for charitable organizations
have always been held to be consonant with
the First Amendment.
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court
of the United States will review the projected federal question since the petitioner
appears to lack the necessary substantial

financial interest. [See Doremus v. Board
of Education, 342 U. S.429 (1952)].
[For a treatment of various interpretations placed upon "charity" and similar
terms see 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 172-76
(April 1956). For another aspect of the
problem of public aid to private education
see 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 333-35 (October
1955)].
Sunday Laws
In the case of Humphrey Chevrolet, Inc.
v. City of Evanston,1 a group of automobile dealers brought an action to enjoin the
city from enforcing an ordinance requiring
businesses to close on Sunday on the
ground that, as against them, its enforcement would be discriminatory. The highest
state court of Illinois held that the ordinance was constitutional as a reasonable
exercise of the city's police power.
"Sunday laws" are traceable to 321 A.D.
when Constantine the Great, then a heathen,
passed an edict commanding all inhabithnts
of cities to rest on that day. 2 Since then
various forms of Sunday prohibitory laws
have evolved throughout the world and
3
have been enacted in all the states.
Different jurisdictions hold different views
on the purpose of such laws 4 but generally
speaking there is a twofold objective: first,
to protect the right to undisturbed observance of the Sabbath and, secondly to provide a day of rest for the working class.
The power of legislatures to pass "clos17 111. 2d 402, 131 N.E. 2d 70 (1956).
2 21 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 565 (1951).
3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 380-452 (Blakely ed.

1949).
4 See, e.g., People ex rel. Moffat v. Zimmerman,
48 Misc. 203, 95 N.Y. Supp. 136 (Sup. Ct. 1904);
State ex rel. Walker v. Judge, 39 La. Ann. 132,
1 So. 437 (1887); Arrigo v. City of Lincoln, 154
Neb. 537, 48 N.W. 2d 643 (1951).

THE CATHOLIC LAWYER, JULY,

1956

ing" laws has never been successfully questioned and cannot be disputed. 5 The power
is universally held to emanate from the
general welfare aspect of police power.,
However, some courts in particular instances have recognized that similar laws
7
may lose their effectiveness.
. While the power to enact "Sunday laws"
is beyond doubt, certain purported enactments regulating Sunday conduct have been
outlawed by the courts as unreasonable and
arbitrary. Thus in Mt. Vernon v. Julian the
court said: "... . [A]n act which has no
tendency to affect or endanger the public
in connection with health, safety, morals,
or general welfare and which is entirely
innocent in character, is not within the
police power." ' 8 In that case, a grocery
store owner was convicted under an ordinance which contained a general closing
provision but which exempted such business establishments as eating places, drug
stores, tobacco shops, ice dealers, gas stations and telegraph offices. In holding the
ordinance unconstitutional the court said:
We do not see where the public welfare is

served by closing the grocery store and
allowing a confectionery store to remain
open, nor in closing a notions store while
a drug store next door which sells notions
is permitted to operate ... These distinc-

tions appear to be entirely arbitrary .... 9
An objection raised repeatedly by Sab5 People v. Dunford, 207 N.Y. 17, 100 N.E. 433
(1912).
6 Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 I1. 447, 17 N.E. 2d
52 (1938).
7 "No citizen any longer makes a complaint under
them, and thus they become dead letter laws. It is
not the business of the police to revive them."
People ex rel. Pool v. Hesterberg, 43 Misc. 510,
513, 89 N.Y. Supp. 498, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
8 369 Ill. 447, 17 N.E. 2d 52, 55 (1938).

9 Ibid.

batarians (those who keep holy the seventh
day of the week) is that "Sunday laws" infringe upon the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing freedom of religious worship;
but that contention has been consistently
overruled.10
Basically, there are three principal types
of Sunday legislation: (a) that 'Which prohibits only particular kinds of business
establishments but permits all others to remain open;" (b) that which contains a
general closing provision but exempts from
the operation of the law certain business
which may sell the same products as those
prohibited to open on Sunday; 12 and (c)
the commodity-type which ptohibits all
business activities but exempts the sale of
10 See Silverberg Bros. v. Douglass, 62 Misc. 240,
114 N.Y. Supp. 824 (Sup. Ct. 1909) in which the
court held that "Sunday laws" do not interfere
with the religious liberty of any person but rather
are restraints upon civil liberty within the police
power. The court in Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal.
502 (1858) held that the legislature was powerless to enact Sunday laws on the ground that they
would infringe upon freedom of religion. However, that view was subsequently overruled by the
same court in Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679
(1861).
11 See, e.g., the statute passed upon in Eden v.
People, 161 111.296, 43 N.E. 1108 (1896): "[lit
shall be unlawful for any person or persons to keep
open any barber shop or carry on the business of
shaving, haircutting, or tonsorial work on Sunday,
within this state."
12 A typical example of this type is the ordinance
reviewed in Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 111.447,
17 N.E. 2d 52 (1938): "It shall be unlawful for
any person to keep open or permit to be kept
open his place of business on Sunday within this
city; provided, that this section shall not be applicable in cases of necessity or charity, nor to
hotels, restaurants, eating places, drug stores, tobacco stores, confectionery stores, news dealers,
ice dealers, shoe shining parlors, garages, gasoline
filling stations, telephone exchanges, telegraph offices and moving picture theatres."
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certain commodities from the operation of
3
the law.'
In the instant case, the court for the first
time passed on the validity of the commoditytype, similar to that of New York State,
after having previously declared unconstitutional ordinances of the other two types.
Similarly, other jurisdictions including New
York have been upholding the commoditytype of "Sunday law" 14 while striking down
the other two as discriminatory and unreasonable. 15 It would appear from the
cases that the test as to whether a "closing"
ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary is
13 Typifying this type of "closing" law is N.Y.
PENAL LAW §2147: "All manner of public selling
or offering for sale of any property upon Sunday
is prohibited, except as follows: 4. Prepared tobacco, bread, milk, eggs, ice, soda-water, fruit,
flowers, confectionery, souvenirs, newspapers, gasoline, oil, tires, drugs, medicines and surgical instruments, may be sold in places other than a
room where spiritous or malt liquors or wines are
kept or offered for sale and may be delivered at
any time of the day."
14 Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct.
666 (1900), affirming, 74 Minn. 376, 77 N.W.
225 (1898); People ex rel. Moffatt v. Zimmerman, 48 Misc. 203, 95 N.Y. Supp. 136. (Sup. Ct.
1904); Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So.
321 (1894); People v. Krotkiewicz, 286 Mich. 644,
282 N.W. 852 (1938); State ex rel. Hoffman v.
Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N.W. 325 (1904);
Komen v. St. Louis, 316 Mo. 9, 289 S.W. 838
(1926); State v. Diamond, 56 N.D. 854, 219 N.W.
831 (1928); Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wash. 429,
258 Pac. 328 (192.7).
15 Among the cases in which courts have declared
unconstitutional ordinances which contained a

this: Do the exemptions from the provision
relate to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the people? Does the ordinance affect all persons similarly situated
or engaged in the same business without
discrimination?
From the very nature of the commoditytype of Sunday legislation, since it affords
the same opportunities to dealers in the
same products, it would therefore appear
that this type of provision would be least
likely to be declared discriminatory and
hence would serve as a sound guide for
legislatures desirous of enacting some form
of "closing" law.
general closing provision but which exempted certain businesses which may sell the same products
as those prohibited to open are: Gaetano Bocci &
Sons Co. v. Town of Lawndale, 208 Cal. 720, 284
Pac. 654 (1930); Allen v. Colorado Springs, 101
Colo. 498, 75 P. 2d 141 (1938); Mt. Vernon v.
Julian, 369 111. 447, 17 N.E. 2d 52 (1938); Ex
parte Hodges, 65 Okla. Crim. 69, 83 P. 2d 201
(1938); Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140
P. 2d 939 (1943).
Typical of the cases in which courts have outlawed that type of legislation which prohibits only
particular kinds of businesses but permits all others
to remain open are: In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 109
(1885); Cowan v. Buffalo, 157 Misc. 71, 282
N.Y. Supp. 880 (Sup. Ct. 1935), af0'd, 247 App.
Div. 591, 288 N.Y. Supp. 239 (4th Dep't 1936);
Elliott v. State, 29 Ariz. 389, 242 Pac. 340 (1926);
In re Scaranino, 7 Cal. 2d 309, 60 P. 2d 288
(1936); Eden v. People, 161 111.296,43 N.E. 1108
(1896); Ex pare Ferguson, 62 Okla. Crim. 145,
70 P. 2d 1094 (1937); Stewart Motor Co. v.
Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N.W. 332 (1931).

